Stability with One-Sided Incomplete Information

37 Pages Posted: 12 Jan 2017

See all articles by Sushil Bikhchandani

Sushil Bikhchandani

University of California, Los Angeles - Anderson School of Management

Date Written: January 1, 2017

Abstract

Two notions of stability, ex ante stability and Bayesian stability, are investigated in a matching model with non-transferrable utility, interdependent preferences, and one-sided incomplete information. Ex ante stable matching-outcomes are unblocked for every belief on the blocking partner’s type while Bayesian stable matching-outcomes are unblocked with respect to prior beliefs. Ex ante stability is a minimal requirement. Bayesian stability is a more selective desideratum with sound efficiency properties.

Keywords: Stable Matching, Incomplete Information, Incomplete-Information Core

JEL Classification: C78, D47, D82

Suggested Citation

Bikhchandani, Sushil, Stability with One-Sided Incomplete Information (January 1, 2017). Journal of Economic Theory, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2896953

Sushil Bikhchandani (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles - Anderson School of Management ( email )

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