Common Problems

18 Pages Posted: 9 Dec 2016 Last revised: 10 Mar 2017

See all articles by Sanford C. Gordon

Sanford C. Gordon

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics

Dimitri Landa

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics

Date Written: November 21, 2016

Abstract

We examine the intuition that in supermajoritarian settings, polarization and policy-making gridlock are fundamentally linked, but that a pressing common problem can reduce both. When actors' individual costs from a policy addressing such a problem differ, their preferences over the appropriate policy respond asymmetrically to increases in the magnitude of the problem. In a broad range of circumstances such increases can give rise to increased polarization, but may also simultaneously yield net welfare enhancing policy adjustments rather than entrenchment of gridlock. The association of polarization and gridlock is contingent on two underlying factors: how the problem responds to the policy solution, and the location of the status quo policy when the extent of the problem changes. We illustrate the model's logic by comparing U.S. national policy making in the Progressive Era and the present.

Keywords: Polarization, Gridlock, Legislative Productivity

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Gordon, Sanford C. and Landa, Dimitri, Common Problems (November 21, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2882236 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2882236

Sanford C. Gordon (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics ( email )

19 West 4th Street, 2nd Floor
New York, NY 10012
United States

Dimitri Landa

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics ( email )

715 Broadway
New York, NY 10003
United States

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