Enforcing EU Company Law: Requirements and Limitations in Implementing Penalties for Infringements of EU Company Law

29 Pages Posted: 6 Sep 2016 Last revised: 1 Feb 2017

See all articles by Karsten Engsig Sørensen

Karsten Engsig Sørensen

Aarhus University – Aarhus BSS, Department of Law

Date Written: September 2, 2016

Abstract

This article examines what EU law requires from the Member States when enforcing EU company law. Even though the harmonisation of EU company law seldom addresses the question how the rules should be enforced, EU law in different ways sets bounds to how the enforcement should be conducted. These bounds are set by the requirement for effective enforcement of EU law formulated by the CJEU by free movement rights, fundamental rights and other general principles of EU law. There are so many cases dealing with this issue that it is possible to outline these bounds mainly by analysing cases dealing with company law issues. As a consequence of these bounds, the Member States may have some discretion in deciding the penalties, but they are far from free to do so. If there are major differences in how Member States enforce EU company law, this may cause major problems for the functioning of the internal market. For this reason there is a need to keep a close eye on the enforcement of EU company law in the Member State and, if necessary, harmonise aspects of the enforcement.

Keywords: Enforcement, EU law

JEL Classification: K22

Suggested Citation

Sørensen, Karsten Engsig, Enforcing EU Company Law: Requirements and Limitations in Implementing Penalties for Infringements of EU Company Law (September 2, 2016). Nordic & European Company Law Working Paper No. 16-04, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834778 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2834778

Karsten Engsig Sørensen (Contact Author)

Aarhus University – Aarhus BSS, Department of Law ( email )

Bartholins Allé 16, Building 1410, Room 246
DK-8000 Aarhus C
Denmark

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