30 Pages Posted: 10 Aug 2016
Date Written: August 2016
We study the strategic advantages of following rules of thumb that bundle different games together (called rule rationality) when this may be observed by one's opponent. We present a model in which the strategic environment determines which kind of rule rationality is adopted by the players. We apply the model to characterize the induced rules and outcomes in various interesting environments. Finally, we show the close relations between act rationality and "Stackelberg stability" (no player can earn from playing first).
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
This is a Wiley-Blackwell Publishing paper. Wiley-Blackwell Publishing charges $42.00 .
File name: IERE.pdf
If you wish to purchase the right to make copies of this paper for distribution to others, please select the quantity.