Truth-Revealing Voting Rules for Large Populations

43 Pages Posted: 3 Jul 2016

See all articles by Matias Nuñez

Matias Nuñez

Université Paris Dauphine

Marcus Pivato

THEMA, CY Cergy Paris Université

Date Written: June 23, 2016

Abstract

Deterministic voting rules are notoriously susceptible to strategic voting. We propose a new solution to this problem for large electorates. For any deterministic voting rule, we can design a stochastic rule that asymptotically approximates it in the following sense: for a sufficiently large population of voters, the stochastic voting rule (i) incentivizes every voter to reveal her true preferences and (ii) produces the same outcome as the deterministic rule, with very high probability.

Keywords: Large Elections, Truth-telling, Incentives

JEL Classification: D71

Suggested Citation

Nuñez, Matias and Pivato, Marcus, Truth-Revealing Voting Rules for Large Populations (June 23, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2802679 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2802679

Matias Nuñez (Contact Author)

Université Paris Dauphine ( email )

Place du Maréchal de Tassigny
Paris, Cedex 16 75775
France

Marcus Pivato

THEMA, CY Cergy Paris Université ( email )

33 Boulevard du Port
Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, Cedex 95011
France

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