A Must Lie Situation: Avoiding Giving Negative Feedback

44 Pages Posted: 4 Jul 2016

See all articles by Uri Gneezy

Uri Gneezy

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management

Christina Annette Gravert

University of Copenhagen

Silvia Saccardo

Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Social and Decision Sciences

Franziska Tausch

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Date Written: November 19, 2014

Abstract

We examine under what conditions people provide accurate feedback to others. We use feedback regarding attractiveness, a trait people care about, and for which objective information is hard to obtain. Our results show that people avoid giving accurate face-to-face feedback to less attractive individuals,even if lying in this context comes at a monetary cost to both the person who gives the feedback and the receiver. A substantial increase of these costs does not increase the accuracy of feedback. However, when feedback is provided anonymously, the aversion to giving negative feedback is reduced.

Keywords: Lying, feedback, overconfidence, updating, laboratory experiment

JEL Classification: D03, C91, D83

Suggested Citation

Gneezy, Uri and Gravert, Christina Annette and Saccardo, Silvia and Tausch, Franziska, A Must Lie Situation: Avoiding Giving Negative Feedback (November 19, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2800820 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2800820

Uri Gneezy

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Rady School of Management
La Jolla, CA 92093
United States

Christina Annette Gravert

University of Copenhagen ( email )

Nørregade 10
Copenhagen, DK-1165
Denmark

Silvia Saccardo (Contact Author)

Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Social and Decision Sciences ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

Franziska Tausch

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

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