Technological Progress and Ownership Structure

57 Pages Posted: 27 Jan 2016

See all articles by Heng Geng

Heng Geng

Victoria University of Wellington

Harald Hau

University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI); Swiss Finance Institute; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Sandy Lai

University of Hong Kong

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2016

Abstract

Innovation processes under patent protection generate hold-up problems if complementary patents are owned by different firms. We show that in line with Hart and Moore (1990), shareholder ownership overlap across firms with patent complementarities helps mitigate such hold-up problems and correlates significantly with higher patent investment and more patent success as measured by future citations. The positive innovation effect is strongest for concentrated overlapping ownership and for the cases when the overlapping shareholders are dedicated investors.

Keywords: hold-up problems, innovation, institutional ownership, patents

JEL Classification: G31, G32, L22

Suggested Citation

Geng, Heng and Hau, Harald and Lai, Sandy, Technological Progress and Ownership Structure (January 2016). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11064, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2723325

Heng Geng (Contact Author)

Victoria University of Wellington ( email )

PO Box 600
Wellington, 6140
New Zealand

Harald Hau

University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI) ( email )

40 Boulevard du Pont d'Arve
Geneva 4, Geneva 1211
Switzerland

Swiss Finance Institute

Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Sandy Lai

University of Hong Kong ( email )

Faculty of Business and Economics
K.K. Leung Building, Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong, Pokfulam HK
Hong Kong

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