Insurance Fraud in the Workplace? Evidence from a Dependent Verification Program

26 Pages Posted: 19 Jan 2016

See all articles by Michael Geruso

Michael Geruso

University of Texas at Austin; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Harvey S. Rosen

Princeton University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: December 2015

Abstract

Many employers have implemented dependent verification (DV) programs, which aim to reduce employee benefits costs by ensuring that ineligible persons are not enrolled in their health insurance plans as dependents. We evaluate a DV program using a panel of health plan enrollment data from a large, single‐site employer. We find that dependents were 2.7 percentage points less likely to be reenrolled in the year that DV was introduced, indicating that this fraction of dependents was ineligibly enrolled prior to the program's introduction. There is some evidence consistent with the notion that these dependents were actually ineligible, rather than merely discouraged from reenrollment by compliance costs. We find no indication that the removal of these ineligible dependents spilled over to affect the enrollment of eligible dependents within the same family.

Suggested Citation

Geruso, Michael and Rosen, Harvey S., Insurance Fraud in the Workplace? Evidence from a Dependent Verification Program (December 2015). Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 82, Issue 4, pp. 921-946, 2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2717150 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jori.12046

Michael Geruso (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin ( email )

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Harvey S. Rosen

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Princeton, NJ 08544
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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