Cognitive Empathy in Conflict Situations

38 Pages Posted: 15 Jan 2016 Last revised: 14 Mar 2020

See all articles by Florian Gauer

Florian Gauer

Bielefeld University - Center for Mathematical Economics

Christoph Kuzmics

University of Graz - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 7, 2020

Abstract

Two individuals are involved in a conflict situation in which preferences are ex-ante uncertain. While they eventually learn their own preferences, they have to pay a small cost if they want to secretly learn their opponent’s preferences. We show that there is an interval with an upper bound less than one and lower bound greater than zero such that, for sufficiently small positive costs of information acquisition, in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the resulting game of incomplete information the probability of acquiring information about the opponent’s preferences is within this interval.

Keywords: Incomplete Information, Information Acquisition, Theory of Mind, Conflict, Imperfect Empathy

JEL Classification: C72, C73, D03, D74, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Gauer, Florian and Kuzmics, Christoph, Cognitive Empathy in Conflict Situations (March 7, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2715160 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2715160

Florian Gauer

Bielefeld University - Center for Mathematical Economics ( email )

Postfach 10 01 31
Bielefeld, D-33501
Germany
+49 (0) 521 106 4918 (Phone)

Christoph Kuzmics (Contact Author)

University of Graz - Department of Economics ( email )

Universitaetsstrasse 15
RESOWI - F4
Graz, 8010
Austria

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