The Effects of Asset Forfeiture on Policing: A Panel Approach

18 Pages Posted: 27 Nov 2015

See all articles by Brian D. Kelly

Brian D. Kelly

Seattle University - Department of Economics

Maureen Kole

Independent

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2016

Abstract

Asset forfeiture has proven highly controversial in the United States since its expansion in 1984. Most contentious is the widespread policy that allows police agencies to keep the assets seized, which both proponents and critics assert changes police behavior. From newly developed panel data sets, we find some statistical support for the proposition that police agencies change the intensity and pattern of policing in response to forfeiture. However, in economic terms these effects are very weak and do not support the proposition that forfeiture provides vital funds and incentives for crime policing.

JEL Classification: H39, H71, K42

Suggested Citation

Kelly, Brian D. and Kole, Maureen, The Effects of Asset Forfeiture on Policing: A Panel Approach (January 2016). Economic Inquiry, Vol. 54, Issue 1, pp. 558-575, 2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2695900 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12232

Brian D. Kelly (Contact Author)

Seattle University - Department of Economics ( email )

900 Broadway
Seattle, WA 98122
United States

Maureen Kole

Independent ( email )

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