To Trust, or Not to Trust: Cognitive Reflection in Trust Games

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Forthcoming

26 Pages Posted: 4 Oct 2015

See all articles by Brice Corgnet

Brice Corgnet

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute; Chapman University - The George L. Argyros School of Business & Economics

Antonio Espín

University of Granada

Roberto Hernan Gonzalez

Université de Bourgogne - Burgundy School of Business; University of Granada

Praveen Kujal

Middlesex University

Stephen Rassenti

Economic Science Institute, Chapman University

Date Written: October 1, 2015

Abstract

We present results from two studies that show a positive relation between cognitive reflection and trusting behavior, but no significant relation with trustworthy behavior. Our finding holds regardless of individual distributional social preferences and risk aversion. Our results add to a growing body of literature that illustrates the role of cognitive ability in helping explain outcomes in economic experiments.

Keywords: cognitive reflection, trust, trustworthiness, social preferences, betrayal aversion

JEL Classification: C92, D31, D81

Suggested Citation

Corgnet, Brice and Espín, Antonio and Hernan Gonzalez, Roberto and Kujal, Praveen and Rassenti, Stephen, To Trust, or Not to Trust: Cognitive Reflection in Trust Games (October 1, 2015). Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2669073

Brice Corgnet

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute ( email )

One University Dr.
Orange, CA 92866
United States

Chapman University - The George L. Argyros School of Business & Economics ( email )

One University Dr.
Orange, CA 92866
United States

Antonio Espín (Contact Author)

University of Granada ( email )

Campus de Cartuja S/N
Granada, Granada 18071
Spain

Roberto Hernan Gonzalez

Université de Bourgogne - Burgundy School of Business ( email )

29 rue Sambin
Dijon, 21006
France

University of Granada ( email )

C/Rector López Argueta S/N
Granada, Granada 18071
Spain

Praveen Kujal

Middlesex University ( email )

The Burroughs
London, NW4 4BT
United Kingdom

Stephen Rassenti

Economic Science Institute, Chapman University ( email )

One University Drive
Wilkinson Hall 104
Orange, CA 92866
United States
714-628-2802 (Phone)

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