Endogenous Firms' Organization, Internal Audit and Leniency Programs

38 Pages Posted: 16 Sep 2015

See all articles by Emilie Dargaud

Emilie Dargaud

University of Lyon 2

Armel Jacques

Université de la Réunion

Date Written: September 7, 2015

Abstract

When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements on different markets, they may wish to compartmentalize their agreements managing them with different individuals in order to avoid the contagion of antitrust authority investigations. Sometimes the leniency programs are efficient to defeat this strategy and to induce CEO to launch internal investigations and report the obtained hard evidence to the antitrust authority. However these programs may have pro-collusive effects for centralized firms.

Keywords: Collusion, antitrust policy, leniency programs, multimarket contact, organizational form

JEL Classification: K42, L22, L41

Suggested Citation

Dargaud, Emilie and Jacques, Armel, Endogenous Firms' Organization, Internal Audit and Leniency Programs (September 7, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2660777 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2660777

Emilie Dargaud (Contact Author)

University of Lyon 2 ( email )

France

Armel Jacques

Université de la Réunion ( email )

Campus du Moufia
15, avenue Rene Cassin BP 7151 -97 715
Saint-Denis messag cedex 9
France

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
37
Abstract Views
528
PlumX Metrics