A Corporate-Crime Perspective on Fisheries: Liability Rules and Non-Compliance

58 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2015

See all articles by Frank Jensen

Frank Jensen

University of Copenhagen - Institute of Food and Resource Economics

Linda Nøstbakken

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics

Date Written: August 14, 2015

Abstract

The existing fisheries economics literature analyzes compliance problems by treating the fishing firm as one cohesive unit, but in many cases, violations are committed by agents acting on behalf of a firm. To account for this, we analyze the principal-agent relationship within the fishing firm. In the case where the firm directly benefits from illegal fishing, the firm must induce its crew to violate regulations through the incentive scheme. Within this framework, we analyze how the allocation of liability between fishing firms and crew affects quota violations and the ability to design a socially efficient fisheries policy. We show that without wage frictions, it does not matter whom is held liable. However, under the commonly used share systems of remuneration, crew liability generally yields a more efficient outcome than firm liability. Furthermore, asset restrictions may affect the outcome under various liability rules.

Keywords: Fisheries; enforcement; quota compliance; liability; principal-agent problem

JEL Classification: Q2

Suggested Citation

Jensen, Frank and Nøstbakken, Linda, A Corporate-Crime Perspective on Fisheries: Liability Rules and Non-Compliance (August 14, 2015). NHH Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper No. 20/2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2649024 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2649024

Frank Jensen

University of Copenhagen - Institute of Food and Resource Economics ( email )

Rolighedsvej 25
Copenhagen, 1958
Denmark

Linda Nøstbakken (Contact Author)

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics ( email )

Helleveien 30
N-5035 Bergen
Norway
+47-55959134 (Phone)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
36
Abstract Views
379
PlumX Metrics