Unique Stationary Behavior

10 Pages Posted: 20 Aug 2015

Date Written: August 14, 2015

Abstract

We study environments in which agents from a large population are randomly matched to play a one-shot game, and, before the interaction begins, each agent observes noisy information about the partner's aggregate behavior. Agents follow stationary strategies that depend on the observed signal. We show that every strategy distribution admits a unique behavior if each player observe on average less than action of his partner. On the other hand, if each player observes on average more than one action, we show that there exists a stationary strategy that admits multiple consistent outcomes.

Keywords: Markovian process, Random matching.

JEL Classification: C72, C73, D83

Suggested Citation

Heller, Yuval, Unique Stationary Behavior (August 14, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2646960 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2646960

Yuval Heller (Contact Author)

Bar Ilan University ( email )

Dept. of Economics, Building 504
Bar Ilan University
Ramat Gan, 5290002
Israel
+972 5252 82182 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/yuval26/

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