How Proper is the Dominance-Solvable Outcome?

15 Pages Posted: 15 Jul 2015

See all articles by Yukio Koriyama

Yukio Koriyama

Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau - Department of Economics

Matias Nuñez

Université Paris Dauphine

Date Written: July 14, 2015

Abstract

We prove that any normal-form game that is dominance solvable by weak dominance and that satisfies the transference of decision-maker indifference condition (TDI* of Marx and Swinkels [1997]) has a finite number of equilibrium outcomes. This implies that the unique outcome of dominance solvability in these games must coincide with the payoff of a proper equilibrium. We then apply our theorems to both generic outcome-form games and voting games.

Keywords: Weak dominance, Iterated elimination, Proper equilibrium

JEL Classification: C7, C72

Suggested Citation

Koriyama, Yukio and Nuñez, Matias, How Proper is the Dominance-Solvable Outcome? (July 14, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2630596 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2630596

Yukio Koriyama

Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau - Department of Economics ( email )

Route de Saclay
Palaiseau, 91120
France

Matias Nuñez (Contact Author)

Université Paris Dauphine ( email )

Place du Maréchal de Tassigny
Paris, Cedex 16 75775
France

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
47
Abstract Views
500
PlumX Metrics