Representation-Compatible Power Indices

28 Pages Posted: 20 Jun 2015

See all articles by Serguei Kaniovski

Serguei Kaniovski

Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO)

Sascha Kurz

University of Bayreuth

Date Written: June 19, 2015


This paper studies power indices based on average representations of a weighted game. If restricted to account for the lack of power of dummy voters, average representations become coherent measures of voting power, with power distributions being proportional to the distribution of weights in the average representation. This makes these indices representation-compatible, a property not fulfilled by classical power indices. Average representations can be tailored to reveal the equivalence classes of voters defined by the Isbell desirability relation, which leads to a pair of new power indices that ascribes equal power to all members of an equivalence class.

Keywords: average representation, power index, proportionality between weights and power

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Kaniovski, Serguei and Kurz, Sascha, Representation-Compatible Power Indices (June 19, 2015). Available at SSRN: or

Serguei Kaniovski

Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) ( email )

P.O. Box 91
Wien, A-1103

Sascha Kurz (Contact Author)

University of Bayreuth ( email )

Universit├Ątsstr. 30
Lehrstuhl f├╝r Wirtschaftsmathematik
Bayreuth, Bavaria D-95440
+49 921 55 7353 (Phone)
+49 921 55 7352 (Fax)


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