Royalties for Artists Versus Royalties for Authors and Composers

28 Pages Posted: 11 Apr 2001

See all articles by Henry Hansmann

Henry Hansmann

Yale University - Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Marina Santilli

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2001

Abstract

Legislation creating or reinforcing resale royalties for visual artists retains substantial political popularity, particularly in the European Union - despite the often skeptical attitude toward those rights in the economics literature. In this essay, we probe more deeply the affirmative arguments that can be made for a resale royalty right, in either a mandatory or a discretionary form. We also compare the rationale for visual artists' resale royalties with the potential rationales for the now-well-established systems of royalty rights for authors and composers. This comparison has particular interest both because some of the principal arguments made against visual artists' resale royalties also apply to authors' royalties, and because the economic rationale for compensating authors with royalties has itself not been well explored. We also discuss briefly the related subject of display rights for visual artists. We conclude with some general implications for policy.

Keywords: droit de suite, royalties, artists, authors, commissions

JEL Classification: D45, K11, L14, L82

Suggested Citation

Hansmann, Henry and Santilli, Marina, Royalties for Artists Versus Royalties for Authors and Composers (January 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=261392 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.261392

Henry Hansmann (Contact Author)

Yale University - Law School ( email )

P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States
203-432-7101 (Phone)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Marina Santilli

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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