Teams, Organization and Education Outcomes: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Bangladesh

61 Pages Posted: 1 Jun 2015

See all articles by Youjin Hahn

Youjin Hahn

Yonsei University

Asad Islam

Monash University - Department of Economics

Eleonora Patacchini

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Yves Zenou

Monash University - Department of Economics; Stockholm University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: May 2015

Abstract

We study the relationship between network centrality and educational outcomes using a field experiment in primary schools in Bangladesh. After obtaining information on friendship networks, we randomly allocate students into groups and give them individual and group assignments. We find that the groups that perform the best are those whose members have high Katz-Bonacich and key-player centralities. Leaders are mostly responsible for this effect, while bad apples have little influence. Group members' network centrality is also important in shaping individual performance. We show that network centrality captures non-cognitive skills, especially patience and competitiveness.

Keywords: leaders, Network centrality, soft skills, team work

JEL Classification: A14, C93, D01, I20

Suggested Citation

Hahn, Youjin and Islam, Asadul and Patacchini, Eleonora and Zenou, Yves, Teams, Organization and Education Outcomes: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Bangladesh (May 2015). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10631, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2613028

Youjin Hahn (Contact Author)

Yonsei University ( email )

Seoul
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Asadul Islam

Monash University - Department of Economics ( email )

Department of Economics
Monash University
Caulfield East, Victoria
Australia
+61399032783 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://users.monash.edu/~asaduli/

Eleonora Patacchini

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Yves Zenou

Monash University - Department of Economics ( email )

Australia

Stockholm University ( email )

Universitetsvägen 10
Stockholm, Stockholm SE-106 91
Sweden

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI) ( email )

P.O. Box 5501
S-114 85 Stockholm
Sweden

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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