The Career Effects of Scandal: Evidence from Scientific Retractions

59 Pages Posted: 11 May 2015 Last revised: 12 Apr 2021

See all articles by Pierre Azoulay

Pierre Azoulay

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Alessandro Bonatti

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Joshua Krieger

Harvard University - Business School (HBS)

Date Written: May 2015

Abstract

We investigate how the scientific community's perception of a scientist's prior work changes when one of his articles is retracted. Relative to non-retracted control authors, faculty members who experience a retraction see the citation rate to their earlier, non-retracted articles drop by 10% on average, consistent with the Bayesian intuition that the market inferred their work was mediocre all along. We then investigate whether the eminence of the retracted author and the cause of the retraction (fraud vs. mistake) shape the magnitude of the penalty. We find that eminent scientists are more harshly penalized than their less distinguished peers in the wake of a retraction, but only in cases involving fraud or misconduct. When the retraction event had its source in “honest mistakes,” we find no evidence of differential stigma between high- and low-status faculty members.

Suggested Citation

Azoulay, Pierre and Bonatti, Alessandro and Krieger, Joshua, The Career Effects of Scandal: Evidence from Scientific Retractions (May 2015). NBER Working Paper No. w21146, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2604827

Pierre Azoulay (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Alessandro Bonatti

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

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Joshua Krieger

Harvard University - Business School (HBS) ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/profile.aspx?facid=951435

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