The Korean War Termination Experience, 1951-1953: Strategy and Policy Lessons Learned

5 Pages Posted: 11 May 2015

See all articles by Samuel William Bettwy

Samuel William Bettwy

Thomas Jefferson School of Law; USD School of Law

Date Written: February 1, 2015

Abstract

There is insufficient evidence to state definitively why the Chinese and North Koreans agreed to truce negotiations in the first place, why they prolonged the talks, and why they ultimately agreed to the Armistice. Such incomplete, circumstantial evidence makes varying theories possible. Regardless, there was cause for the United States to consider whether it had relied too much on violence and the threat of violence during negotiations. There was also cause to consider whether it should have invited greater input from U.N. coalition partners and whether it should have shown more patience toward the dismissive and disdainful demeanor of the Communist negotiators. There is also cause to consider whether it should have placed more emphasis on pressuring Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.

Keywords: Korean War, war termination, war strategy

Suggested Citation

Bettwy, Samuel William, The Korean War Termination Experience, 1951-1953: Strategy and Policy Lessons Learned (February 1, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2604615 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2604615

Samuel William Bettwy (Contact Author)

Thomas Jefferson School of Law ( email )

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USD School of Law ( email )

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