Reaching Consensus Through Simultaneous Bargaining

25 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2015

See all articles by Jean‐François Laslier

Jean‐François Laslier

University of Angers - French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)

Matias Nuñez

Université Paris Dauphine

Carlos Pimienta

University of New South Wales (UNSW)

Date Written: April 17, 2015

Abstract

We propose a two-player bargaining game where each player simultaneously proposes a set of lotteries on a finite set of alternatives. If the two sets have elements in common the outcome is selected by the uniform probability measure over the intersection. If otherwise the sets do not intersect the outcome is selected by the uniform probability measure over the union. We show that this game always has an equilibrium in sincere strategies (i.e. such that players truthfully reveal their preferences). We also prove that every equilibrium is individually rational and consensual. If furthermore players are partially honest then every equilibrium is efficient and sincere. We use this result to fully characterize the set of equilibria of the game under partial honesty.

Keywords: Approval voting, bargaining, partial honesty, consensual equilibrium

JEL Classification: C70, C72

Suggested Citation

Laslier, Jean‐François and Nuñez, Matias and Pimienta, Carlos, Reaching Consensus Through Simultaneous Bargaining (April 17, 2015). UNSW Business School Research Paper No. 2015-08, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2596972 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2596972

Jean‐François Laslier

University of Angers - French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) ( email )

3, rue Michel-Ange
Paris cedex 16, 75794
France

Matias Nuñez

Université Paris Dauphine ( email )

Place du Maréchal de Tassigny
Paris, Cedex 16 75775
France

Carlos Pimienta (Contact Author)

University of New South Wales (UNSW) ( email )

Kensington
High St
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia

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