Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly Games

35 Pages Posted: 7 Apr 2015

See all articles by Sergio Currarini

Sergio Currarini

University of Leicester - Department of Economics; Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia

Marco A. Marini

University of Rome La Sapienza; CREI, University Rome III

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2015

Abstract

In this paper we review a number of coalitional solution concepts for the analysis of cartel and merger stability in oligopoly. We show that, although so far the industrial organization and the cooperative game theoretic literature have proceeded somehow independently on this topic, the two approaches are highly inter‐connected. We show that different assumptions on the behaviour and on the timing of the coalitions of firms yield very different results on the associations of firms which are stable. We conclude by reviewing some recent extensions of the coalitional analysis to oligopolistic markets with heterogeneous firms and incomplete information.

Suggested Citation

Currarini, Sergio and Marini, Marco A., Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly Games (June 2015). The Manchester School, Vol. 83, Issue 3, pp. 253-287, 2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2591162 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/manc.12058

Sergio Currarini (Contact Author)

University of Leicester - Department of Economics ( email )

Department of Economics
Leicester LE1 7RH, Leicestershire LE1 7RH
United Kingdom

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia ( email )

Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy

Marco A. Marini

University of Rome La Sapienza ( email )

Piazzale Aldo Moro, 5
Rome, 00181
Italy
+39 06 49910843 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/a/uniroma1.it/marcomarini-eng/

CREI, University Rome III ( email )

Via Ostiense, 161
Rome, 00154
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://host.uniroma3.it/centri/crei/

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