Believe, But Verify? The Effect of Market Structure on Corruption in Religious Organizations

12 Pages Posted: 7 Apr 2015

See all articles by Jerg Gutmann

Jerg Gutmann

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law and Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2015

Abstract

This first cross‐country analysis of the causes of corruption in religious organizations provides evidence in support of policy recommendations by Adam Smith. He argued that clergy are best constrained by competition among religious groups. Their appointment and promotion should, however, be regulated by the state. Both factors are shown to confine corruption. In contrast, David Hume's approach of supporting state religion and limiting entry into the religious market is not a promising strategy for mitigating religious corruption. More generally, these results suggest that the private sector may indeed be shielded from sprawling corruption as long as markets are sufficiently competitive.

Suggested Citation

Gutmann, Jerg, Believe, But Verify? The Effect of Market Structure on Corruption in Religious Organizations (May 2015). Kyklos, Vol. 68, Issue 2, pp. 153-164, 2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2591156 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12078

Jerg Gutmann (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law and Economics ( email )

Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany

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