Anatomy of Corruption: An Approach to the Political Economy of Underdevelopment
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Forthcoming
17 Pages Posted: 4 Apr 2015
Date Written: April 2, 2015
An examination and critique of the functionalist literature on corruption in the political administration of less developed countries (LDCs) indicate that its claims are without empirical foundation. Its theses with regard to the political, economic and administrative effects in most LDCs contrast with the facts. No benefits for development from corruption are found; market corruption, for example, does not appear to improve allocative efficiency. The erosion in a government's capacity to formulate and implement policies making for economic growth is an obstacle to economic progress.
Keywords: corruption, politics, economic development, economic growth, efficiency, policy implementation, markets, administrative efficiency, bribery, bribes, extortion
JEL Classification: H19, H79, H80, K40, K42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation