Network Structure and Education Outcomes: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Bangladesh

75 Pages Posted: 7 Mar 2015

See all articles by Youjin Hahn

Youjin Hahn

Yonsei University

Asad Islam

Monash University - Department of Economics

Eleonora Patacchini

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Yves Zenou

Monash University - Department of Economics; Stockholm University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Abstract

We study the causal impact of network centrality on educational outcomes using field experiments in primary schools in Bangladesh. After obtaining information on friendship networks, we randomly allocate students into groups and give them individual and group assignments. We find that groups that perform best are those whose members have high Katz-Bonacich and key-player centralities. Leaders are mostly responsible for this effect, while bad apples have little influence. Own Katz-Bonacich centrality is associated with better individual performance only if it is above the average centrality of the group. Further experiments reveal that leadership, as measured by network centrality, mainly captures non-cognitive skills, especially patience and competitiveness.

Keywords: social networks, centrality measures, leaders, soft skills

JEL Classification: A14, C93, D01, I20

Suggested Citation

Hahn, Youjin and Islam, Asadul and Patacchini, Eleonora and Zenou, Yves, Network Structure and Education Outcomes: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Bangladesh. IZA Discussion Paper No. 8872, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2575052

Youjin Hahn (Contact Author)

Yonsei University ( email )

Seoul
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Asadul Islam

Monash University - Department of Economics ( email )

Department of Economics
Monash University
Caulfield East, Victoria
Australia
+61399032783 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://users.monash.edu/~asaduli/

Eleonora Patacchini

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Yves Zenou

Monash University - Department of Economics ( email )

Australia

Stockholm University ( email )

Universitetsvägen 10
Stockholm, Stockholm SE-106 91
Sweden

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI) ( email )

P.O. Box 5501
S-114 85 Stockholm
Sweden

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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