The (Non-)Robustness of Influential Cheap Talk Equilibria When the Sender's Preferences Are State Independent

23 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2015 Last revised: 25 Mar 2021

See all articles by Christoph Diehl

Christoph Diehl

Bielefeld University

Christoph Kuzmics

University of Graz - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 16, 2021

Abstract

Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) prove the existence of influential cheap talk equilibria in one sender one receiver games when the state is multidimensional and the preferences of the sender are state independent. We show that influential equilibria do not survive the introduction of any small degree of Harsanyi-Uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about the sender's preferences in the spirit of Harsanyi (1973).

Keywords: cheap talk, communication, information transmission, robustness

JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Diehl, Christoph and Kuzmics, Christoph, The (Non-)Robustness of Influential Cheap Talk Equilibria When the Sender's Preferences Are State Independent (March 16, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2566247 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2566247

Christoph Diehl

Bielefeld University ( email )

Universit├Ątsstra├če 25
Bielefeld, 33615
Germany

Christoph Kuzmics (Contact Author)

University of Graz - Department of Economics ( email )

Universitaetsstrasse 15
RESOWI - F4
Graz, 8010
Austria

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