Real Estate Agents, House Prices, and Liquidity

Posted: 6 Jan 2015

See all articles by Henry J. Munneke

Henry J. Munneke

University of Georgia - Department of Insurance, Legal Studies, Real Estate

Joseph T. L. Ooi

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Real Estate

C. F. Sirmans

Florida State University - Department of Risk Management, Insurance, Real Estate & Business Law

Geoffrey K. Turnbull

University of Central Florida

Date Written: January 5, 2015

Abstract

Comparing agent-owner with agent-represented home sales illustrates that commission contracts lead to external agent moral hazard. Real estate developers are sophisticated sellers who can either use external agents or hire internal agents. The theory shows that neither scheme eliminates agent moral hazard. The empirical study of how the seller-agent relationship affects both price and liquidity in a simultaneous system concludes that external agents enjoy superior selling ability that offset moral hazard effects.

Keywords: Real estate agents; House prices; Liquidity; Moral hazard

Suggested Citation

Munneke, Henry J. and Ooi, Joseph T. L. and Sirmans, C. F. and Turnbull, Geoffrey K., Real Estate Agents, House Prices, and Liquidity (January 5, 2015). Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2545455

Henry J. Munneke (Contact Author)

University of Georgia - Department of Insurance, Legal Studies, Real Estate ( email )

Athens, GA 30602-6254
United States
(706) 542-0496 (Phone)
(706) 542-4295 (Fax)

Joseph T. L. Ooi

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Real Estate ( email )

4 Architecture Drive
Singapore 117566
Singapore

C. F. Sirmans

Florida State University - Department of Risk Management, Insurance, Real Estate & Business Law ( email )

Tallahasse, FL 32306
United States
850 644-4076 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cob.fsu.edu/rmi

Geoffrey K. Turnbull

University of Central Florida ( email )

4000 Central Florida Blvd
Orlando, FL 32816-1400
United States

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