Transnational Terrorism as a Spillover of Domestic Disputes in Other Countries

Defence and Peace Economics; (2002) DOI: 10.1080/10242690500070078

Posted: 28 Oct 2014

See all articles by Tony Addison

Tony Addison

United Nations University

Syed Mansoob Murshed

Institute of Social Studies (ISS)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2002

Abstract

This paper models transnational terrorism as a three-way strategic interaction involving a government that faces armed opposition at home, which may spill over in the form of acts of terrorism by the state's opponents against the government's external sponsor. The external sponsor also utilises deterrence against potential terrorists, which only lowers terrorism if terrorists are not intrinsically motivated by a deep-seated sense of humiliation. The model highlights the importance of intrinsic motivation. A rise in the external power's preference for deterrence against terrorism may backfire in these circumstances. Increases in the government's military efficiency against the rebels, who are also terrorists against the government's sponsor, raises overall levels of violence.

Suggested Citation

Addison, Tony and Murshed, Syed Mansoob, Transnational Terrorism as a Spillover of Domestic Disputes in Other Countries (February 2002). Defence and Peace Economics; (2002) DOI: 10.1080/10242690500070078 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2515259

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Syed Mansoob Murshed

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