The Evolution of Inequality Aversion in a Simplified Game of Life
45 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2014
Date Written: October 24, 2014
This paper applies the indirect evolutionary approach to study the evolution of inequality aversion in a simplified game of life. The game comprises a dilemma, a problem of coordination, and a problem of distribution as a general framework for the evolution of preferences. In single game environments, there emerges a global advantage for inequality-averse individuals in the dilemma and a global disadvantage for inequality-averse players who are favoured by the problem of distribution. The simplified game of life puts these strong predictions into perspective. In particular, selfish and inequality-averse individuals may coexist in the subpopulation, favoured in the problem of distribution.
Keywords: inequality aversion, evolution, preferences
JEL Classification: C72, C73
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation