Provider Competition and Over-Utilization in Health Care

45 Pages Posted: 8 Oct 2014

See all articles by Jan Boone

Jan Boone

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); TILEC

Rudy Douven

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis; CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2014

Abstract

This paper compares the welfare effects of three ways in which health care can be organized: no competition (NC), competition for the market (CfM) and competition on the market (CoM) where the payer offers the optimal contract to providers in each case. We argue that each of these can be optimal depending on the contracting environment of a speciality. In particular, CfM is optimal in a clinical situation where the payer either has contractible information on provider quality or can enforce cost efficient protocols. If such contractible information is not available NC or CoM can be optimal depending on whether patients react to decentralized information on quality differences between providers and whether payer’s and patients’ preferences are aligned.

Keywords: competition, health care, selective contracting, over-utilization, mechanism design

JEL Classification: D82, L5, I11

Suggested Citation

Boone, Jan and Douven, Rudy, Provider Competition and Over-Utilization in Health Care (October 2014). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2014-038, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2506651 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2506651

Jan Boone (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2399 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3042 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

TILEC ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Rudy Douven

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis ( email )

P.O. Box 80510
The Hague, 2508 GM
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.cpb.nl/nl/org/homepages/rcmhd/

CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis ( email )

P.O. Box 80510
The Hague, 2508 GM
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.cpb.nl/nl/org/homepages/rcmhd/

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