Auction Design for Claims Trading

19 Pages Posted: 17 Sep 2014

See all articles by Anthony J. Casey

Anthony J. Casey

University of Chicago Law School; ECGI

Date Written: January 27, 2014

Abstract

This essay explores the benefits of having a court-facilitated auction (or auctions) of claims in bankruptcy where the court oversees the exclusive auction of claims on the estate just as it does with estates and their assets. I argue that this court-facilitated auction will reduce many of the costs inherent in a claims-trading market; and it will do so with minimal regulation of the market participants and minimal disruption of pre-bankruptcy entitlements. Moreover, the introduction of a central auction house provides for previously unrecognized solutions to some of the more stubborn problems of modern bankruptcy. Chief among those are the empty-voting and empty-core problems that – according to some scholars and practitioners – arise from the increasing involvement of hedge funds in the process.

Keywords: bankruptcy, hedge funds, investment

Suggested Citation

Casey, Anthony Joseph, Auction Design for Claims Trading (January 27, 2014). American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2496463

Anthony Joseph Casey (Contact Author)

University of Chicago Law School ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/casey

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