The Impact of Eliminating the Form 20-F Reconciliation on Shareholder Wealth: Evidence from U.S. Cross-Listed Firms

Posted: 15 Jun 2014

See all articles by Lucy Huajing Chen

Lucy Huajing Chen

Villanova University

Inder K. Khurana

University of Missouri at Columbia - Robert J. Trulaske, Sr. College of Business

Date Written: June 14, 2014

Abstract

This paper examines shareholder wealth effects in U.S. and home-country markets relating to the SEC’s decision to eliminate the Form 20-F reconciliation. During the period of examined events, we find positive cumulative abnormal returns for the treatment sample of U.S. cross-listed firms that prepare financial statements under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) but no such effects for our control sample comprising cross-listed non-IFRS, U.S. domestic, or home-country firms. We find the stock market impact for our treatment sample to be positively related to our proxy for cost savings and negatively related to the pre-adoption reconciliation magnitude from IFRS to U.S. GAAP. This suggests shareholders place some value on reconciliation information, but generally the costs of preparing and auditing reconciliations outweigh concern about information loss. Moreover, we find that information loss is less pronounced for firms having used IFRS for a longer period, suggesting the learning effect mitigates information loss.

Keywords: earnings reconciliation; U.S. cross-listing; disclosure regulation; IFRS; Form 20-F reconciliation

Suggested Citation

Chen, Lucy Huajing and Khurana, Inder, The Impact of Eliminating the Form 20-F Reconciliation on Shareholder Wealth: Evidence from U.S. Cross-Listed Firms (June 14, 2014). Accounting Review, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2450639

Lucy Huajing Chen (Contact Author)

Villanova University ( email )

United States
610-519-6321 (Phone)

Inder Khurana

University of Missouri at Columbia - Robert J. Trulaske, Sr. College of Business ( email )

331 Cornell Hall
Columbia, MO 65211
United States
573-882-3474 (Phone)
573-882-2437 (Fax)

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