Media Competition and Electoral Politics

IEB Working Paper N. 2014/14

50 Pages Posted: 26 Mar 2014

See all articles by Amedeo Piolatto

Amedeo Piolatto

Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona Economics Institute (IEB); Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)

Florian Schuett

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 24, 2014

Abstract

We build a framework linking competition in the media market to political participation. Media outlets report on the ability of candidates running for office and compete for audience through their choice of slant. Citizens consume news only if the expected utility of being informed about candidates' ability is sufficiently large for their group collectively. Our results can reconcile seemingly contradictory empirical evidence showing that entry in the media market can either increase or decrease turnout. While information pushes up independent turnout, partisans adjust their turnout to the ability of their preferred candidate, and on average they vote less when informed.

Keywords: demand for news, electoral turnout, group-rule utilitarianism, media bias

JEL Classification: D72, L82

Suggested Citation

Piolatto, Amedeo and Schuett, Florian, Media Competition and Electoral Politics (March 24, 2014). IEB Working Paper N. 2014/14, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2413944 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2413944

Amedeo Piolatto (Contact Author)

Autonomous University of Barcelona ( email )

Department of Economics and Economic History
Edifici B - Campus Bellaterra
Barcelona, 08193
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/piolatto/

Barcelona Economics Institute (IEB) ( email )

c/ John M. Keynes, 1-11
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/piolatto/

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Florian Schuett

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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