China's Capital Controls: Through the Prism of Covered Interest Differentials

23 Pages Posted: 20 Feb 2014

See all articles by Yin-Wong Cheung

Yin-Wong Cheung

City University of Hong Kong - Department of Economics & Finance; University of California, Santa Cruz - Department of Economics; University of California at Santa Cruz - Department of Economics

Risto Herrala

European Central Bank (ECB) - Directorate General International and European Relations

Date Written: February 2014

Abstract

We study the renminbi covered interest differential, an indicator of the effectiveness of capital controls. It is found that the differential is not shrinking over time and, in fact, appears larger after the global financial crisis than before. That is, capital controls in China are still substantial and effective. In addition to exchange rate changes and volatilities, the renminbi covered interest differential is affected by credit market tightness indicators. The marginal explanatory power of these macroeconomic factors, however, is small relative to the autoregressive component and the dummy variables that capture changes in China's policy.

Suggested Citation

Cheung, Yin-Wong and Herrala, Risto, China's Capital Controls: Through the Prism of Covered Interest Differentials (February 2014). Pacific Economic Review, Vol. 19, Issue 1, pp. 112-134, 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2398674 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.12054

Yin-Wong Cheung (Contact Author)

City University of Hong Kong - Department of Economics & Finance ( email )

83 Tat Chee Avenue
Kowloon
Hong Kong

University of California, Santa Cruz - Department of Economics ( email )

435 Engineering 2
Santa Cruz, CA 95064
United States
831-459-4247 (Phone)
831-459-5077 (Fax)

University of California at Santa Cruz - Department of Economics ( email )

1156 High Street
Santa Cruz, CA 95064
United States

Risto Herrala

European Central Bank (ECB) - Directorate General International and European Relations ( email )

Kaiserstrasse 29
D-60311 Frankfurt am Main
Germany

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