US - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp and Diamond Sawblades from China: Never Ending Zeroing in the WTO?

World Trade Review (2014, Forthcoming)

17 Pages Posted: 15 Feb 2014

See all articles by Dukgeun Ahn

Dukgeun Ahn

Seoul National University

Patrick A. Messerlin

Groupe d'Economie Mondiale at Sciences Po (GEM Paris)

Date Written: October 16, 2013

Abstract

Despite many legal rulings to clarify the WTO inconsistency of zeroing practices, in practically all aspects of antidumping proceedings, the United States declined to categorically rectify the illegal antidumping duties based on zeroing calculation methods. This dispute is merely example of a number of disputes where the US government had to exhaust the whole process for proper implementation of the WTO rulings under its domestic legal system. The US approach is starkly contrasted with the position taken by the European Union that categorically terminates zeroing practices pursuant to the WTO rulings. While the WTO system indeed recognizes individual Member’s peculiar regulatory systems and policies during implementation phases, the current situation in which WTO Members must individually resort to the dispute settlement system in order to rectify the US zeroing practices raises a serious concern regarding the legitimacy and integrity of the WTO dispute settlement system. Maybe it is time for WTO Members to agree on better implementation mechanisms before more Members try to develop overly burdensome and complicated regulatory processes for compliance.

Keywords: zeroing, anti-dumping, shrimp, sawblades

JEL Classification: F10, F13

Suggested Citation

Ahn, Dukgeun and Messerlin, Patrick A., US - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp and Diamond Sawblades from China: Never Ending Zeroing in the WTO? (October 16, 2013). World Trade Review (2014, Forthcoming), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2396297

Dukgeun Ahn (Contact Author)

Seoul National University ( email )

Graduate School of International Studies
Sillim, Kwanak-gu
Seoul, 151-742
82-2-880-9249 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://gsis.snu.ac.kr

Patrick A. Messerlin

Groupe d'Economie Mondiale at Sciences Po (GEM Paris) ( email )

197 Boulevard Saint Germain
197 Bd St Germain Paris 75007, 75007
France

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