Cooperative Membership as a Trust and Trustworthiness Reinforcing Device: Results from a Field Experiment in the Philippines

Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(3), pages 412-425, 2012

Posted: 30 Jan 2014

See all articles by Leonardo Becchetti

Leonardo Becchetti

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics

Stefano Castriota

University of Perugia

Pierluigi Conzo

University of Turin - Department of Economics and Statistics; Collegio Carlo Alberto

Date Written: December 07, 2012

Abstract

We test the hypothesis that cooperative membership is a trust and trustworthiness reinforcing device and that, as such, it affects (in a trust game) both trustors' and trustees' transfers and beliefs. In considering trust games played by sugar farmers in the Philippines, we find that (i) cooperative membership induces higher levels of trust and trustworthiness even in non-members because the players' behaviour is influenced by the information about their counterparts' cooperative membership status; (ii) an in-group bias is at work since, contrary to non-members' expectations, the positive affiliation-trustworthiness link works only among cooperative members.

Keywords: investment game, trust, cooperation, signalling

JEL Classification: C93, O12, D03

Suggested Citation

Becchetti, Leonardo and Castriota, Stefano and Conzo, Pierluigi, Cooperative Membership as a Trust and Trustworthiness Reinforcing Device: Results from a Field Experiment in the Philippines (December 07, 2012). Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(3), pages 412-425, 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2387431

Leonardo Becchetti

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Via Columbia, 2
I-00133 Rome
Italy

Stefano Castriota

University of Perugia ( email )

Via Pascoli 22
Perigoa, 06121
Italy

Pierluigi Conzo (Contact Author)

University of Turin - Department of Economics and Statistics ( email )

Campus Luigi Einaudi
Lungo Dora Siena 100 A
Torino, Torino 10153
Italy
011/6703892 (Phone)
011/6703895 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.pieroconzo.altervista.org/wordpress/

Collegio Carlo Alberto ( email )

Piazza Arbarello, 8
Torino, 10122
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.carloalberto.org/people/faculty/affiliates/pierluigi-conzo/

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