Loosely Coupled Results Control in Dutch Municipalities

26 Pages Posted: 17 Jan 2014

See all articles by Hugo Van Hengel

Hugo Van Hengel

Brilliant Future

Tom Groot

VU University Amsterdam - Amsterdam Research Center in Accounting

Tjerk Budding

VU University Amsterdam - Amsterdam Research Center in Accounting

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2014

Abstract

This paper analyses the implementation of the ‘dual system’ in Dutch municipalities which was part of a package of New Public Management‐reforms. This system was stimulated by Dutch central government and called for more accountability for performance of municipal managers and the board of mayor and aldermen, as well as for the use of more output and outcome information. Interviews of participants on four different hierarchical levels in 12 municipalities show that the practices of output management at different hierarchical levels are only loosely coupled to each other (‘vertical loose coupling’). We also found some degree of ‘horizontal loose coupling’ at each hierarchical level between result orientation, the development of output indicators and the use of output information for performance evaluation. The paper analyses the reasons why municipalities encounter difficulties in designing a comprehensive and coherent performance management system.

Keywords: New Public Management, performance measurement, institutional theory, loose coupling, municipalities

Suggested Citation

Van Hengel, Hugo and Groot, Tom and Budding, Tjerk, Loosely Coupled Results Control in Dutch Municipalities (February 2014). Financial Accountability & Management, Vol. 30, Issue 1, pp. 49-74, 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2380387 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/faam.12027

Hugo Van Hengel (Contact Author)

Brilliant Future ( email )

Sveavägen 13, 10 tr.
Stockholm, Stockholms län 11157
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://www.brilliantfuture.se

Tom Groot

VU University Amsterdam - Amsterdam Research Center in Accounting ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Netherlands

Tjerk Budding

VU University Amsterdam - Amsterdam Research Center in Accounting ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Netherlands

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