The Trade Effects of US Anti‐Dumping Actions Against China Post‐WTO Entry

20 Pages Posted: 14 Jan 2014

See all articles by Guobing Shen

Guobing Shen

Fudan University

Xiaolan Fu

University of Oxford

Date Written: January 2014

Abstract

Since China's entry into the WTO, US anti‐dumping (AD) actions against China have increased, particularly with respect to multiple petitions. Distinguishing between US single and multiple petitions, we examine the trade effects of US AD actions against China based on an unbalanced panel of quarterly trade data. The results show that a US single petition investigation greatly restrains US imports of the filed products from China but also causes more significant import diversion from non‐named countries. In the short run, a preliminary AD duty imposed on China via a US multiple petition not only restrains US imports of the filed products from China but also prevents trade diversion from non‐named countries. In the long run, a final AD duty on China resulting from a US multiple petition creates a larger destructive effect on China and causes US import diversion from non‐named countries. Thus, a final AD duty imposed on China following a US multiple petition not only harms China's exports but also fails to help the US achieve import substitution. Furthermore, we have been able to reveal the negative trade effect of a preliminary AD duty even in cases where the ultimate decision is not to impose a final duty.

Suggested Citation

Shen, Guobing and Fu, Xiaolan, The Trade Effects of US Anti‐Dumping Actions Against China Post‐WTO Entry (January 2014). The World Economy, Vol. 37, Issue 1, pp. 86-105, 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2378662 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/twec.12125

Guobing Shen (Contact Author)

Fudan University

Beijing West District Baiyun Load 10th
Shanghai, 100045
China

Xiaolan Fu

University of Oxford ( email )

3 Mansfield Road
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX1 3TB
United Kingdom

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