A Methodological Note on a Weighted Voting Experiment

28 Pages Posted: 8 Dec 2013

See all articles by Eric Guerci

Eric Guerci

Université de Nice Sophia Antipolis

Nobuyuki Hanaki

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research

Naoki Watanabe

University of Tsukuba

Gabriele Esposito

Joint Research Center of the European Commission

Xiaoyan Lu

Johnson & Johnson

Date Written: December 1, 2013

Abstract

We conducted a sensitivity analysis of the results of weighted voting experiments by varying two features of the experimental protocol by Montero et al. (2008): (1) the way in which the roles of subjects are reassigned in each round (random role, RR, versus fixed role, FR) and (2) the number of proposals that subjects can simultaneously approve (multiple approval, MA, versus single approval, SA). It was observed that the differences in these protocols had impacts on the relative frequencies of minimum winning coalitions as well as how negotiations proceed. Our analysis favors a protocol with FR-SA for future research, because this protocol induces subjects to commit fewer errors in their decision making than the protocol with RR-MA, and because proposal-objection dynamics are more frequently observed under FR-SA than under RR-MA.

Keywords: weighted voting, experiment, cooperative game, winning coalition

JEL Classification: C71, C92, D72

Suggested Citation

Guerci, Eric and Hanaki, Nobuyuki and Watanabe, Naoki and Esposito, Gabriele and Lu, Xiaoyan, A Methodological Note on a Weighted Voting Experiment (December 1, 2013). Tokyo Center for Economic Research (TCER) Paper No. E-63, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2363982

Eric Guerci

Université de Nice Sophia Antipolis ( email )

250, rue Albert Einstein
B.P. 70
Sophia Antipolis, 06560
France

Nobuyuki Hanaki

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research ( email )

6-1, Mihogaoka
Suita, Osaka 567-0047
Japan

Naoki Watanabe (Contact Author)

University of Tsukuba ( email )

Tsukuba University , Ibaraki Ken
Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8573, Ibaraki 3050006
Japan

Gabriele Esposito

Joint Research Center of the European Commission ( email )

Xiaoyan Lu

Johnson & Johnson ( email )

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