Strike Pay and Employers' Strike Insurance

Metroeconomica, Vol. 51, Issue 3, August 2000

Posted: 14 Jun 2001

See all articles by Laszlo Goerke

Laszlo Goerke

University of Trier - Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Abstract

The consequences of strike pay for employees and of an employers' strike insurance fund are analysed in a two-period screening model of labour disputes with private information of the firm. It is shown that the employers' strike fund reduces uncertainty and hence lowers strike activity. If the union's strike pay fund can incur a deficit during disputes, strike pay will raise strike activity. If strike pay and an employers' insurance are combined, strikes may become less probable.

JEL Classification: J51, J52

Suggested Citation

Goerke, Laszlo, Strike Pay and Employers' Strike Insurance. Metroeconomica, Vol. 51, Issue 3, August 2000, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=236279

Laszlo Goerke (Contact Author)

University of Trier - Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union ( email )

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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