Supplement to: 'Foundations for Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma'

6 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2013 Last revised: 6 Jun 2014

See all articles by Brendan Daley

Brendan Daley

Johns Hopkins University

Philipp Sadowski

Duke University - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 7, 2014

Abstract

We establish that in the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the model of Daley and Sadowski (2014) is logically distinct from three models that employ well-known forms of other regarding preferences: altruism (Ledyard, 1995; Levine, 1998), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and reciprocity (Rabin, 1993).

The paper "Foundations for Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma" to which this Supplement applies is available at the following URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2331579

Suggested Citation

Daley, Brendan and Sadowski, Philipp, Supplement to: 'Foundations for Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma' (May 7, 2014). Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper No. 155, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2331585 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2331585

Brendan Daley

Johns Hopkins University ( email )

Baltimore, MD 20036-1984
United States

Philipp Sadowski (Contact Author)

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

213 Social Sciences Building
Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States
919-660-1800 (Phone)

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