Speculative Attacks, Openness and Crises

Revista Brasileira Economia Rio de Janeiro v. 66 n. 2 / p. 135–165 Abr-Jun 2012

31 Pages Posted: 30 Sep 2013

See all articles by Aloisio Araujo

Aloisio Araujo

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças

Marcia Leon

Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil - Central Bank of Brazil; Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil - Central Bank of Brazil

Rafael Chaves Santos

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças

Date Written: June 24, 2012

Abstract

We extended the Cole and Kehoe model (1996) by adding trade and debt denominated in national currency. We then evaluated some external debt defaults and steep national currency devaluations occurred during last decades. Although default is unlikely, steep devaluation has been repeatedly triggered during financial distresses. It helps to over-come financial crisis as it improves trade balance and reduces national debt level. On the other hand, expected devaluation hurts welfare through both higher national debt cost and reductions in the investment level. We modeled such trade-offs and showed that trade openness, by and large, improves the expected welfare as it allows for a better devaluation-response technology. We ran model simulations based on past 48 crises occurred in 32 middle-income countries, reasonably fitting devaluation and default responses observed as from 1971.

Keywords: trade-openness, speculative attacks, debt crisis

JEL Classification: F34, F41, H63

Suggested Citation

Araujo, Aloisio and Leon, Marcia and Chaves Santos, Rafael, Speculative Attacks, Openness and Crises (June 24, 2012). Revista Brasileira Economia Rio de Janeiro v. 66 n. 2 / p. 135–165 Abr-Jun 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2330315

Aloisio Araujo (Contact Author)

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças ( email )

Praia de Botafogo 190/1125, CEP
Rio de Janeiro RJ 22253-900
Brazil

Marcia Leon

Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil - Central Bank of Brazil ( email )

P.O. Box 08670
SBS Quadra 3 Bloco B - Edificio-Sede
Brasilia, Distr. Federal 70074-900
Brazil

Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil - Central Bank of Brazil ( email )

P.O. Box 08670
SBS Quadra 3 Bloco B - Edificio-Sede
Brasilia, Distr. Federal 70074-900
Brazil

Rafael Chaves Santos

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças ( email )

Praia de Botafogo 190/1125, CEP
Rio de Janeiro RJ 22253-900
Brazil

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