Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment

10 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2013 Last revised: 13 Jan 2014

Date Written: January 12, 2014

Abstract

Demichelis and Weibull (2008 AER) show that adding lexicographic lying costs to coordination games with cheap talk yields a sharp prediction: only the efficient outcome is evolutionarily stable. I show that this result is caused by the discontinuity of preferences rather than by small lying costs per se. Finally, I discuss why discontinuity may not be an appealing assumption in evolutionary models.

Keywords: Lexicographic preferences, evolutionary stability, cheap talk

JEL Classification: C73

Suggested Citation

Heller, Yuval, Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution: Comment (January 12, 2014). American Economic Review, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317915 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2317915

Yuval Heller (Contact Author)

Bar Ilan University ( email )

Dept. of Economics, Building 504
Bar Ilan University
Ramat Gan, 5290002
Israel
+972 5252 82182 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/yuval26/

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