A Map of Approval Voting Equilibra Outcomes

26 Pages Posted: 6 Jul 2013 Last revised: 16 Feb 2015

See all articles by Sebastien Courtin

Sebastien Courtin

University of Cergy-Pontoise

Matias Nuñez

Université Paris Dauphine

Date Written: February 2015

Abstract

We fully characterize in a mass election model the set of candidates that can win with positive probability in equilibrium when the voters are allowed to vote for as many candidates as they want. If at most two candidates can win for some undominated strategy profile (“in the race” candidates), we predict that the unique equilibrium outcome is the victory of the Condorcet Winner. For any election with more candidates “in the race”, we show that all the candidates “in the race” can be tied for victory.

Keywords: Approval voting, Condorcet winner, Voting equilibria, Candidates in The Race

JEL Classification: D70, D72

Suggested Citation

Courtin, Sebastien and Nuñez, Matias, A Map of Approval Voting Equilibra Outcomes (February 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2289977 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2289977

Sebastien Courtin

University of Cergy-Pontoise ( email )

33 Boulevard du Port
Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, Cedex 95011
France

Matias Nuñez (Contact Author)

Université Paris Dauphine ( email )

Place du Maréchal de Tassigny
Paris, Cedex 16 75775
France

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