Osha Enforcement, Industrial Compliance and Workplace Injuries

47 Pages Posted: 10 Feb 2001 Last revised: 11 Aug 2021

See all articles by Ann P. Bartel

Ann P. Bartel

Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Lacy Glenn Thomas

Emory University - Department of Organization & Management

Date Written: August 1982

Abstract

This paper develops and tests a three-equation simultaneous model of OSHA enforcement behavior, industrial compliance and workplace injuries. The enforcement equation is based on the assumption that OSHA acts as a political institution that gains support through the transfer of wealth from firms to employees; the empirical results are largely consistent with this notion. Contrary to previous work, we find that OSHA enforcement efforts have, indeed, had a statistically significant impact on industrial compliance and, further, that this compliance has led to a statistically significant decrease in worker injuries. The point estimate of the elasticity of the lost workday rate with respect to the OSHA inspection rate is -.04.

Suggested Citation

Bartel, Ann P. and Thomas, Lacy Glenn, Osha Enforcement, Industrial Compliance and Workplace Injuries (August 1982). NBER Working Paper No. w0953, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=228075

Ann P. Bartel (Contact Author)

Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Lacy Glenn Thomas

Emory University - Department of Organization & Management ( email )

1300 Clifton Road
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States

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