The Political Economy of Capital Controls

38 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2004 Last revised: 2 Aug 2008

See all articles by Alberto F. Alesina

Alberto F. Alesina

Harvard University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Vittorio Grilli

Independent; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti

Senior Fellow; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: May 1993

Abstract

This paper calculates international income transfers which implement a Pareto optimal trade equilibrium in a world where many countries trade many goods.

Suggested Citation

Alesina, Alberto F. and Grilli, Vittorio and Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, The Political Economy of Capital Controls (May 1993). NBER Working Paper No. w4353, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=227033

Alberto F. Alesina (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Vittorio Grilli

Independent

Ministero del Tesoro
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti

Senior Fellow ( email )

1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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