The Value of Stable Ownership During the Global Financial Crisis

42 Pages Posted: 5 May 2013

See all articles by Andy Lardon

Andy Lardon

University of Antwerp

Christof Beuselinck

Catholic University of Lille - IESEG School of Management

Marc Deloof

University of Antwerp; University of Antwerp - Antwerp Management School

Date Written: May 2, 2013

Abstract

We investigate the value of stable ownership for a large sample of European firms from 2005 to 2010, using the global financial crisis as an exogenous shock and using pre-and post-crisis periods as benchmarks. Controlling for ownership concentration, we find that stable blockholder ownership results in higher stock returns during the crisis, but not before and after the crisis. The positive effect of stable ownership applies to both family blockholders and institutional blockholders. While the beneficial effect of stable ownership generally does not depend on investor protection, stable institutional blockholders are more valuable in countries with weaker investor protection. During the financial crisis, ownership stability is also associated with lower idiosyncratic risk and higher investments.

Keywords: Ownership Stability, Ownership Concentration, Global Financial Crisis, Stock Returns, Idiosyncratic Risk, Investments

JEL Classification: G01, G32

Suggested Citation

Lardon, Andy and Beuselinck, Christof and Deloof, Marc, The Value of Stable Ownership During the Global Financial Crisis (May 2, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2260372 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2260372

Andy Lardon

University of Antwerp ( email )

Prinsstraat 13
Antwerp, 2000
Belgium

Christof Beuselinck

Catholic University of Lille - IESEG School of Management ( email )

3 Rue de la Digue
Office: A321
Puteaux, 92800
France
+33320545892 (Phone)

Marc Deloof (Contact Author)

University of Antwerp ( email )

Prinsstraat 13
Faculteit TEW
Antwerpen, 2000
Belgium
+32 3 265 41 69 (Phone)
+32 3 265 47 99 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.uantwerpen.be/en/staff/marc-deloof/

University of Antwerp - Antwerp Management School ( email )

Boogkeers 5
Antwerp, 2000
Belgium

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