Implementing Market Access

37 Pages Posted: 7 Sep 2000 Last revised: 29 Oct 2015

See all articles by Kala Krishna

Kala Krishna

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Suddhasatwa Roy

California State University, Fullerton - Department of Economics

Marie C. Thursby

Georgia Institute of Technology - Strategic Management Area; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 1996

Abstract

The outcome of trade policies to increase access for foreign firms to the home country's market is shown to be sensitive to the implementation procedure used. The importance of the timing of moves between government and firms is highlighted by focusing on taxes and subsidies to implement minimum market share requirements. Both taxes and subsidies chosen by the home government after firms have picked prices create powerful incentives for firms to raise prices - effects that are similar in nature to those found with quotas/VERs. We show that some degree of imprecision in implementing the target engenders less anticompetitive outcomes relative to perfect enforcement.

Suggested Citation

Krishna, Kala and Roy, Suddhasatwa and Thursby, Marie C., Implementing Market Access (May 1996). NBER Working Paper No. w5593, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=225536

Kala Krishna (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Economics ( email )

523 Kern Graduate Building
University Park, PA 16802-3306
United States
814-865-1106 (Phone)
814-863-4775 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Suddhasatwa Roy

California State University, Fullerton - Department of Economics ( email )

Fullerton, CA 92834
United States

Marie C. Thursby

Georgia Institute of Technology - Strategic Management Area ( email )

800 West Peachtree St.
Atlanta, GA 30308
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
22
Abstract Views
1,117
PlumX Metrics