Auctions with an Inexpert Bidder

UIUC Dept. Economics Working Paper 00-0100

15 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2000

See all articles by George Deltas

George Deltas

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics

Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Business Administration

Date Written: January 2000

Abstract

We consider an auction in which the behavior of one potential bidder departs mildly from full rationality. We show that the presence of such an inexpert bidder can be enough to discourage all of an infinitely large population of fully rational potential bidders from entering an auction. Furthermore, this departure from full rationality does not reduce the inexpert bidder?s payoff.

JEL Classification: D44

Suggested Citation

Deltas, George and Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, Auctions with an Inexpert Bidder (January 2000). UIUC Dept. Economics Working Paper 00-0100, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=224878 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.224878

George Deltas (Contact Author)

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics ( email )

1206 South Sixth Street
450 Commerce West
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
217-333-4586 (Phone)
217-244-6678 (Fax)

Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Business Administration ( email )

1206 South Sixth Street
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
217-333-1028 (Phone)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
78
Abstract Views
1,266
rank
366,707
PlumX Metrics