Fraud in the Workplace? Evidence from a Dependent Verification Program

48 Pages Posted: 5 Apr 2013 Last revised: 10 Apr 2021

See all articles by Michael Geruso

Michael Geruso

University of Texas at Austin; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Harvey S. Rosen

Princeton University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: April 2013

Abstract

Many employers have implemented dependent verification (DV) programs, which aim to reduce employee benefits costs by ensuring that ineligible persons are not enrolled in their health plan as dependents. We evaluate a DV program using a panel of health plan enrollment data from a large, single-site employer. We find that dependents were 2.7 percentage points less likely to be reenrolled in the year that DV was introduced, indicating that this fraction of dependents was ineligibly enrolled prior to the program's introduction. We show that these dependents were actually ineligible, rather than merely discouraged from re-enrollment by compliance costs.

Suggested Citation

Geruso, Michael and Rosen, Harvey S., Fraud in the Workplace? Evidence from a Dependent Verification Program (April 2013). NBER Working Paper No. w18947, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2245454

Michael Geruso (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin ( email )

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Harvey S. Rosen

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Germany

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